Abstract:  The science and philosophy of perceptual consciousness is driven by introspective data. Oddly, such data is accorded a privilege that might not be deserved. Rather, as with any data, the conditions and means by which it is collected matters to its reliability. Further, the nature of the introspective channel delivering this data has not been subject to sufficient empirical scrutiny, and when so subject, a different picture of introspection emerges. In this talk, I address these broader issues indirectly by considering the specific phenomenon of blurry vision. Philosophers have made strong claims, on the basis of introspection, about the nature of “phenomenal blur”, but I shall present an alternative to these claims from a cognitive science perspective. In the background is skepticism concerning a set of common claims about consciousness and our access to it that might not stand up to empirical scrutiny. I apply empirical friction to demonstrate how our conception of introspection and certain “obvious” claims about blur and perceptual consciousness might be strikingly mistaken.

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